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Recommendations
\ incentives for voluntary reporting  
creating incentives is vital for such an approach.  
A commitment to voluntary reporting should have a  
positive effect on the level of assistance that states 
receive in the framework of the ATT. furthermore, parti­
cipation in the reporting system should be taken as an 
indicator for the trustworthiness of states as partners 
on the international arms market.
\ denial reporting
States parties to the ATT should discuss how a system of 
denial reporting could look like. States could start to 
pro vide information on denials of arms export licences 
confidentially and on a voluntary, rather informal, basis, 
possibly leading to a more standardised process in the 
future. later on stage, this might be complemented by 
an aggregated report on denials that would be made 
public.
\ transparency as a key issue for the att
The ATT needs a reporting mechanism that increases 
transparency of the international arms trade. Trans­
parency is a precondition to monitoring the adherence 
of signatory states to the criteria of the ATT and pro vides 
the basis for the further development of international 
norms for arms transfers.
\ minimum standards 
At a minimum, states parties to the ATT should aim to 
report on authorised and actual exports of conventional 
arms covered under Article 2 (1) of the ATT. information 
provided should include the numbers and description 
of transferred weapons, the financial value of the licence, 
transit countries and the recipient country.
\ opportunities for optional reporting 
A standardised reporting template should provide the  
opportunity to offer additional information, such as 
more details on the end­users and on the condition of 
the weapons. Such a voluntary segment should further 
include the exports of ammunition/munitions, parts 
and components, production licences, technologies and  
equipment for the manufacturing of conventional arms.
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With the entry into force of the International Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT) on 24 December 2014, there is, for 
the first time ever, a legally binding, international 
treaty that sets norms and rules for the regulation of 
the international arms trade. At the centre of the 
ATT is a set of rules assessing all and prohibiting certain 
arms transfers. A state, for example, shall not author-
ise transfers, if it “has knowledge” that the arms would 
be used to commit genocide or other crimes against 
humanity and war crimes [Art. 6 (3)]. The list of factors 
that states shall take into account when assessing their 
arms transfers includes, among others, the potential 
that these arms would undermine peace and security or 
that they could be used to commit serious violations 
of international humanitarian law or international 
human rights law [Art. 7]. If a state concludes that there 
is an “overriding risk” that an arms transfer would 
have such consequences, then it must not authorise it. 
A central challenge for the states parties to the ATT 
will be to find a mode to operationalise the assessment 
criteria of arms transfers so that they can be applied 
to their export decisions. As these criteria leave room 
for interpretation, and as the assessment process  
remains completely in the hands of the states, it is to be 
feared that many states will make use of this leeway 
to justify arms transfers they deem in their interest. 
This might not always be in line with the aims and 
the spirit of the ATT. If this happens, the ATT will not 
live up to one of the major reasons for having such  
an international treaty, which is to hinder the states 
from undercutting their standards for arms exports 
to sell their arms on the international arms market, 
which is becoming more and more of a buyer’s mar-
ket. Stopping the race to the bottom and instead lev-
elling the playing field for all actors involved is a cen-
tral goal of the ATT. Whether there will be a chance to 
reach this goal will heavily depend on the procedures 
that will be set up for the implementation of the ATT.
The first Conference of States Parties will take place 
in Mexico City from 24 to 27 August 2015. At this con-
ference, states will have to decide about several is-
sues, such as financing, the rules of procedures and 
the set-up of the secretariat. Of central importance for 
the successful implementation of the ATT is the issue 
of reporting, which is closely related to the issue of 
transparency. Article 13 requires states to provide an 
initial report on the implementation of the Treaty 
(i.e. with respect to national laws and regulations) as 
well as an annual report on their conventional arms 
exports. The first annual report will be due by 31 May 
2016, covering the ex- and imports of 2015.
transparency is key to successful att implementation
Interest in the international arms trade has grown 
steadily over the past years. As a consequence, trans - 
parency has become more important. Transparency 
should be assessed not only by the quantity of available 
information, but even more so by its quality. 
A lot of interest among civil society, NGOs and aca-
demia has led to changes in the level of transparency 
and reporting on the arms trade. Yet, even today, the 
level of transparency varies from state, to state as some 
provide very detailed and timely information on their 
arms exports and imports through national reports or 
regional and international instruments, while others 
constantly refrain from reporting. Publishing reports 
on arms exports and imports remains a sensitive issue 
for most states, and official information given by gov-
ernments remains sketchy, is often inconsistent, with 
some specific information still not being available.
Transparency is not an end in itself. It is a necessary 
tool that allows external observers as well as signatory 
states to the ATT to verify the adherence of states parties 
to the criteria and obligations of the Treaty. Access to 
information is indispensable for monitoring the imple-
mentation of treaties such as the ATT.  A timely report-
ing of exports and imports of all arms would encourage 
democratic accountability as it opens up the opportuni-
ties for scrutinising governments. Addition ally, transpa-
rency may also dissuade states from engaging in illegal 
arms transfers. It enables building con fidence among 
states, especially when states parties to the ATT need 
the assurance that others will respect the rules of the 
Treaty. Increased transparency also allows states to 
reject unfair criticism if they have acted within the law 
or based their decisions on justifiable political reasons.
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Due to the vagueness of the criteria of the ATT, trans-
parency is of particular importance because only in 
an incremental process, in which governments discuss 
the appropriateness of their arms transfers and civil 
society is in the position to observe this process, can 
the criteria become more concrete over time. Only on 
the basis of the knowledge about state’s arms export 
practice can their adherence to the norms of the ATT 
be assessed, their interpretation of the criteria be re-
traced and eventually questioned. Societies and civil 
society organisations have played a crucial role in the 
creation of the ATT. They can play an important role 
in the implementation process, too, by holding (their) 
governments accountable for their decisions on arms 
transfers. In order to do so, they need detailed infor-
mation about the export practices of governments. 
The ATT reporting mechanism can contribute to in-
creased transparency and make a difference here. The 
level of transparency as well as reporting patterns, how-
ever, will be key issues for the effectiveness of the ATT. 
In this regard, and with the first Conference of States 
Parties approaching, several questions have to be ad-
dressed. Looking at existing instruments for reporting 
on international arms transfers, such as the UN Register 
of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and the annual report of 
EU Member States in the framework of the EU Common 
Position on Arms Exports agreed upon in 2008, provide 
useful hints to an answer to these questions as well as 
examples of well-established reporting instruments.
minimum standard plus optional reporting
UNROCA is a key international mechanism for official 
and public transparency on arms transfers. It was 
established in 1992 after an intense debate about the 
transparency of arms transfers within the United 
Nations. It requests all UN Member States to annually 
report information on arms exports and imports of 
seven categories of conventional weapons. It provides 
states with a standardised reporting template allowing 
external observers to assess comprehensive and com-
parable information. Such a standardised template 
should be established for the ATT reporting mechanism, 
too. It could be designed as a ‘flexible blueprint’, subject 
to changes after regular reviews and identified needs.
Such a template would specify the minimum stan-
dards for reporting, i.e. the information that all states 
parties to the Treaty are required to provide in their 
annual report. In addition to the minimum standards, 
there should be a segment for optional reporting, 
providing states with the opportunity, and encouraging 
them, to provide additional information on a volun-
tary basis. Experience from UNROCA shows that states 
indeed use that opportunity. 
Such a system has the advantage that it does not over-
burden states. To insist on very high standards for 
reporting runs the danger of jeopardising an agree-
ment among the states parties to the Treaty. Further-
more, it could compromise future efforts to strengthen 
the universality of the ATT. In other words, states 
should not be discouraged from joining the ATT be-
cause they are reluctant to provide as much informa-
tion on their arms transfers as EU Member States, 
for example. Thus setting minimum standards that 
most states feel they can comply with and, at the same 
time, providing the opportunity to voluntarily go  
beyond these minimum standards and setting incen-
tives for states to actually make use of this opportunity 
could be the way forward.
Which categories of weapons shall states report on?
States parties to the ATT are required to report on the 
exports and imports of the following conventional 
weapons that fall under the scope of the treaty accord-
ing to Article 2 (1): battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, 
attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile 
launchers, and finally, small arms and light weapons. 
These are, basically, the seven categories of the UN 
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) plus small 
arms and light weapons (SALW). UNROCA considers 
reporting on transfers of SALW as well as on procure-
ment from domestic production and on states’ mili-
tary holdings to be voluntary. A major weakness of the 
Register, according to critics, is the items covered by it. 
Whereas most states report major conventional weap-
ons, not all weapons are covered by the seven catego-
ries of the Register. Over the last twenty years, differ-
ent expert groups have suggested changes to include 
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also includes additional items such as ammunition, 
components and surveillance technology.
With Art. 2 (1) of the ATT, the minimum standard for the 
categories of weapons that states shall report on is set: 
the seven categories of UNROCA plus small arms and 
light weapons. However, it will be important to open up 
the definition of these categories to cover more military 
goods (such as drones), to lower the threshold for artil-
lery calibre, as well as the threshold for the displace-
ment of vessels and submarines, especially to allow 
for a better coverage of technological developments. 
The considerations for the reporting mechanism of the 
ATT should not stop here. The standardised reporting 
template should give governments the opportunity to 
go beyond these minimum standards and to report 
also on their transfers of ammunition/munitions, parts 
and components, production licences, technologies 
and equipment for the manufacturing of conventional 
weapons. Reporting on these categories should be vol-
untary. Otherwise, this procedure could alienate too 
many ATT states parties and keep other states from 
joining the ATT. 
How detailed should the information be?
While the minimum standards for weapons catego-
ries to report on are largely set by the ATT text, there 
is more leeway with regard to the information that 
has to be provided on the transfers of those weapons. 
The value or the numbers of the weapon systems  
exported must be reported. While the number and type 
of weapons in particular can be a useful indicator for 
assessing the fighting capacity and hence the increase 
in military power of the recipient state, to make such 
an assessment, however, additional information on the 
condition of the weapons, such as whether they are 
used or new, would also be important. 
Other very important issues are information about 
the designated end user (military, police, industry, 
other actors) of the weapons and their transit countries 
and routes as well as the companies involved. This in-
formation would provide a considerable increase in 
trans parency and would allow for a better evaluation 
new weapon systems. However, except for the intro-
duction of the optional reporting of SALW in 2003, 
not much has happened in this regard. The ATT report-
ing is an opportunity to overcome some of the short-
comings of UNROCA. Making SALW reporting manda-
tory is already an important step. 
In contrast to these categories of weapons, explicit  
reporting requirements do not exist for ammunition/ 
munitions or for parts and components. While the ATT 
requires states parties to establish national control 
systems to regulate the export of these items, they do 
not have to report on their exports. This is unfortu-
nate, because often it is the (re-)supply with ammu-
nition/ munitions and/or parts of and components for 
certain weapons that allows state or non-state actors 
to make effective use of these weapons in the first 
place. Other issues that were debated in the preparatory 
process of the ATT, but did not make their way into 
the scope of the Treaty, are, for instance, production 
licences, technologies and equipment for the manu-
facturing of conventional weapons. Transparency with 
regard to these issues is very important, because they 
enable the recipient countries to build up their own 
defence industry and later on become an arms exporter 
as well. This is legitimate if these countries can be  
expected to adhere to the principles and norms of the 
ATT. Otherwise, the transfer of technology and know l-
edge can, in the medium to long term, do more harm 
than the export of the weapons themselves. 
Generally, it is important to separate reporting under 
the ATT and as part of UNROCA, as both instruments 
are different in scope. Yet, when states compile infor-
mation for reporting under the ATT they should be 
encouraged to also report to UNROCA. 
Drawing on the experience of reporting under the  
EU Common Position might be one way to overcome a 
few of those difficulties as EU Member States’ reporting 
follows the 21 categories agreed under the EU common 
military list. These categories cover a broad range of 
military goods ranging from SALW up to armoured 
vehicles and fighter aircrafts. In contrast to other  
reporting instruments, the EU common military list 
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annual report on its exports and imports of conven-
tional arms in the preceding calendar year to the sec-
retariat by 31 May of the following year. The Treaty 
text, however, leaves it at the discretion of the states to 
report either on the authorised or the actual exports 
and imports. For UNROCA, states are requested to  
report on their actual exports and imports of conven-
tional weapons only. For the consolidated annual EU 
report on arms exports, states are required to report 
on the number of arms export licences, the financial 
value of their export licences approved and on the  
financial volume of actual exports. However, they do 
not have to provide information on the numbers of 
weapon systems as is the case for UNROCA. The ATT  
reporting can significantly contribute to an increase  
in transparency by combining the strengths of both 
of these instruments.
Authorised exports are particularly suited as the cen-
tral criterion for assessing a government’s adherence 
to the norms of the ATT because it is the government’s 
sole responsibility to decide about the authorisation, 
while actual exports can be influenced by other factors. 
Furthermore, most states will probably find it easier 
to report on the authorised exports because govern-
ments need to issue export licences, which they record 
whereas the financial volume of actual exports is 
more difficult to monitor. Yet, the degree of transparen-
cy is highest when both, authorised and actual exports, 
are reported. There might be, and in fact often are, 
differences between the authorised and actual exports 
due to lacking capacities in compiling the necessary 
data or as a result of usual fluctuations within the arms 
trade. Consequently, it is acceptable that minimum 
reporting requirements tolerate the reporting of either. 
Still, reporting on the authorised and on the actual 
ex- and imports must be the aim. States parties to the 
ATT should set themselves a deadline to achieve this 
goal and improve their capacities to report on both. 
More experienced states with sufficient resources 
should assist other states in doing so. 
A tricky issue is the question of the reporting of 
loans, leasing and gifts of weapons. While these are 
not explicitly mentioned in the ATT’s definitions of 
of the safety of transit routes and the reliability of ac-
tors involved in the logistics. This could also contribute 
to limiting the risk of an unintended proliferation of 
weapons. 
Here, the ATT reporting mechanism could make a 
real difference by providing information beyond ex-
isting instruments. Whereas UNROCA and the EU 
Common Position list the transferred items in the re-
spective categories, occasionally with a short descrip-
tion of the item, they fall short of providing detailed 
information about the transit route or the end-user. 
They only mention the recipient country. Both instru-
ments do not provide any information about the con-
dition of transferred weapons or goods. 
While the minimum standards should include the 
type, value, and number of the weapons, as well as the 
recipient and transit countries, information on the 
end user and condition of the weapons should be part 
of the optional segment of the reporting template, as 
several states will probably deem this information to be 
too sensitive. 
With regard to the details on those categories that are 
not part of the minimum standards, an optional seg-
ment would allow states much flexibility. They could 
provide those details that they deem to be in accordance 
with their best interests. At the end of the day, it is 
better that a government states that it has exported 
ammunition to a certain country, without mention-
ing any further details, than to report nothing at all 
on this transfer.
The case of the EU annual report illustrates that it can 
work to start with few details and to increase trans-
parency in an incremental, step-by-step process. The 
detail of reporting in the EU has increased quite sub-
stantially since the first publication of the report in 
1999 with more and more disaggregated data being 
provided for the 21 categories of the military list. 
Which transfers are to be reported?
This question should not be underrated. According to 
Art. 13 (3) of the ATT, each state party shall submit an 
TransparenT reporTing for a successful arms Trade TreaTy \ Max M. Mutschler, Jan Grebe 
6 \ bicc \ policy brief 1 \ 2015
discuss what such a system of denial reporting for the 
ATT could look like. Similar to the EU mechanism, 
states could start to provide information on denials 
confidentially and on a rather informal basis. It would 
not be mandatory for states parties to the ATT to par-
ticipate in this process, yet, to create an incentive for 
parti cipation only those states that provide information 
would receive information. At a later stage, this might 
be complemented by reporting the aggregated num-
ber of denials for each recipient country to the ATT 
secretariat, which, in turn, could compile an aggre-
gated report on denials that would be made public. 
should the reports be made public or not?
The text of the ATT does not contain any requirement 
for states parties to make their reports or the infor-
mation contained in them available to the public. The 
annual reports are to be submitted to the secretariat. 
Whether it will make them publicly available is still 
an open question. Seen purely from the perspective of 
transparency, answering this question would be 
straight forward: all information of the ATT reporting 
process should be available to the public. The example 
of the EU is interesting here, too. As a result of more 
political awareness, arms export scandals within EU 
Member States and against the background of bloody 
conflicts in the first half of the 1990s, EU Member States 
agreed on an EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 
1998. Interestingly, first planned as a confidential  
information-sharing procedure among EU Member 
States, it was the Finnish Presidency that immediately 
served the interest in transparency and accountability, 
paving the way for a publicly available consolidated 
report.
However, we should expect many states to be very reluc-
tant to provide certain information if it was publically 
available. So, there is a trade-off between the degree of 
detail of information and the public availability of it. 
What states are willing to publicly report and what kind 
of information they would like to share with other 
states confidentially needs to be carefully assessed. 
Again, the distinction between minimum standards 
and optional reporting might be useful. Reported data 
of the minimum standards must be available to the 
“transfer” [Art. 2 (2)] or “exports” and “imports” [Art. 12 (3)], 
a majority of states considers them to fall under the 
scope of the ATT, too. Therefore, these activities should 
become part of the reporting and indeed be included 
in the minimum standards. Excluding them would 
mean to accept a significant gap in transparency.
should denials be reported?
It would be important to report not only on the exports 
authorised but also on those denied. Such denial- 
reporting was originally foreseen by the Chair of the ATT 
Preparatory Committee in a non-paper of July 2011, 
but was removed during the first round of official ne-
gotiations in 2012. From a legal point of view, there 
are hardly any obstacles to reporting on licence denial, 
as long as these are official and not just rejected pre-
liminary enquiries. Politically, however, it might be 
difficult for states to publically report on licence denials, 
as this could affect diplomatic relations. While report-
ing on denials could be politically sensitive, such in-
formation is a crucial indicator to assess the inter-
pretation of the Treaty’s criteria. 
While UNROCA does not include any reporting on  
denials, the annual EU report requires states to provide 
such information referring to the criteria of the EU 
Common Position on which the denial is based. In 
addition, EU Member States have agreed to a regular 
and confidential exchange of information on their 
denials of arms export licences. A major reason behind 
this rationale is to avoid “undercutting” export stan-
dards within the EU. The annual report only indicates 
the aggregated number of denials for each recipient 
country, referring to the category of the military list 
and stating the criteria that were the reason for the 
denial. The annual report does not indicate which EU 
Member State has issued the denial.
Surely, it will be difficult to find a majority among states 
parties to the ATT in favour of establishing a system of 
denial reporting. Such an endeavour might create too 
much resistance at the moment, which might hamper 
the entire process of agreeing on a common reporting 
scheme for the ATT and on achieving universality. 
Nevertheless, governments should at least start to 
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this would mean that not even being a state party to 
the ATT will have to be considered negatively. Other-
wise, the incentive to improve reporting would create  
a disincentive to join the ATT. 
public. Otherwise, the whole idea of increasing trans-
parency by the ATT will be undermined. Clearly, it would 
be the best option to make the optional information 
public, too. However, if there is not enough support for 
that, it would be better to provide this kind of informa-
tion to the secretariat on a confidential basis, than not 
to provide it at all. This does not preclude the option 
to make more and more information public in a step-
by-step process.
setting incentives
Experiences from UNROCA illustrate that several states 
use the opportunity to provide more information than 
is required. However, a closer look also shows that the 
reporting morale varies significantly among states and 
has decreased over the years. In order to prevent the 
ATT reporting mechanism from a similar fate, states 
parties to the Treaty must create incentives for report-
ing in general and to optional reporting in particular.
While this is a major challenge, there are several start-
ing points. First of all, those states that already do pro-
vide this information, i.e. EU Member States as well 
as a number of NATO countries and other states, should 
lead the reporting process by providing all the infor-
mation included in the voluntary segment of the tem-
plate, thereby setting the standard. States can learn 
from each other’s practices, and more experienced 
states may share their knowledge with others. They 
should encourage other states to follow their example 
and assist them in building up their national systems 
for the control of their arms transfers to have the 
capacity to provide this information in the first place. 
Eventually, such assistance could be conditional upon 
a commitment of the respective states to increase 
transparency on their arms transfers. 
Probably, a particularly strong incentive would be cre-
ated if participation in the reporting mechanism by 
states parties to the ATT was taken into account by 
states when authorising export licences. In other words, 
fulfilling the ATT reporting minimum standards, and 
even going beyond them, would have to become a 
means for states to show that they are trustworthy 
partners on the international arms market. Of course, 
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